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The consensus view on the operation of the gold standard prior to World War I maintains that 
there was a marked contrast between the experience of “core” and “peripheral” countries.1 
Enjoying a high degree of credibility, the former could resort to an almost perfectly elastic supply 
of short term capital, which provided them a more or less automatic offset to any balance of 
payments disequilibrium. Hence, the more advanced core countries were able to finance their 
current account deficits without resorting to interest rate hikes with concomitant disruptions on 
the real sector. When foreign financial resources were needed to settle the current account, these 
economies could depend on the exchange rate to bear the brunt of the adjustment, relying on the 
willingness of foreign investors to finance a temporary deficit. Whenever the exchange rate 
depreciated towards the lower gold point, - i.e. the point at which it might become profitable to 
convert notes against gold at the central bank and ship the proceeds abroad, rather than purchase 
foreign exchange - market participants began increasingly to anticipate a future re-appreciation of 
the currency which, in turn, implied future capital gains. Peripheral countries, in stark contrast, 
did not enjoy such an easy access to foreign exchange, and lacked sufficient credibility, leaving 
them no other choice than to attract foreign capital either through interest rate hikes, or to give up 
convertibility altogether and let the exchange rate depreciate below the gold points. 
The vicissitudes of the Austro-Hungarian currency deserve our attention from this point of 
view, in as much as the Habsburg Monarchy lay in an amorphous middle ground between these 
polar “ideal types”. On the one hand, its more back2ward economy, its reliance in some parts on 
foreign capital,3 and especially the gyrations of its currency until the mid 1890s led observers to 
place it, at least for the first part of the period under consideration, in the plebeian group of  
“peripheral” countries, and correctly so.4 However, the stabilisation of the florin after 1896 
(known as Valuta Regulierung) and the ability of the Central Bank (Austro-Hungarian Bank) to 
implement very successfully a shadow (i.e. de facto) gold standard with the exchange rate of the 
florin remaining within an informal [ ± 0.4%] band was reported to be the one that would have 
prevailed had a strict gold standard with unrestricted convertibility been implemented, would 
undoubtedly place the Dual Monarchy in the aristocratic club of core countries, and even more 
convincingly so after the turn of the century.5 
This paper surveys the modern history of the Habsburg monetary union6 in order to explore a 
number of related issues pertaining to the nature and evolution of the credibility of its currency, 
with the goal of contributing to the literature on the working of the financial architecture during 
the apogee of liberalism and of the halcyon days of the classical gold standard. Being placed 
squarely in this middle ground between core and periphery, the case of the Austro-Hungarian 
currency union should afford important insights into the larger picture of European monetary 
history prior to the debacle of 1914. 
I. From flexibility to fixity 
The monetary history of the Dual Monarchy between 1867 and 1913 can be divided into three 
main epochs: 1) from the Compromise of 1867, which gave the constitutional foundations to a de 
facto monetary union between the two parts of the Monarchy, Austria and Hungary, until 1892, 
the florin Österreichische Währung (fl. Ö.W.) was linked to silver, though it was not convertible 
after 1879, and in reality, the currency actually floated quite substantially (variations could be as 
large as ± 7%); 2) In 1892 the silver link was formally severed, and the monarchy went on the 
gold standard, introducing a new parity and a new currency, the crown (kronen) (1kg gold=3280 
crowns); 3) though de jure convertibility continued to elude the monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian 
Bank was successful in stabilising the crown by 1896 and thereafter managed very successfully a 
de facto shadow gold standard until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. 
1. Paper money dragging a silver anchor: 1867-1892 
The Dual Monarchy continued the silver standard that prevailed prior to the Compromise with 
a brief flirtation with gold in the early 1870s. The florin had been inconvertible, in the main, 
though, because the fiscal demands brought about by the recurrent wars fought by Franz Joseph 
defending Austrian political hegemony in Central Europe meant frequent resort to a monetary tax, 
i.e., paper issues.7 A number of humiliating military defeats, most recently at the hands of Prussia 
and Italy brought this era to a close and called for a reorientation of Habsburg monetary policy.8 
An agreement was signed with France that was supposed to have paved the way for a resumption 
of specie payments on a gold basis. The Act of March 9, 1870 created 4 and 8 florins gold ‘trade’ 
coins that had the very same gold content as the 10 and 20 francs French coins. The spirit of the 
times favored universalism, and the liberals on the Continent were dreaming of a monetary union 
for Europe, perhaps for the world.9 Yet, convertibility was elusive, and the Austrian currency 
effectively continue to float. 
 In 1871-72 the Austrian National Bank (ÖNB, afterwards the Austro-Hungarian Bank) made 
some attempts to leave the silver standard, as it began exchanging its silver reserves for gold.10 In 
March 1872, the provision that limited the amount of gold in the reserves of the Bank to one-
fourth was abolished. Yet, no decisive action was taken, and a return to convertibility (in either 
gold or silver) remained a mere plan on paper. In fact, while the ÖNB adhered faithfully to its 
cover ratio, the existence of an outstanding stock of government notes that had the same legal 
status as the notes of the bank, reduced the effective cover to little, since this stock was of a size 
comparable to the bank’s notes in circulation.11 The crisis of 1873 made the prospect of currency 
stabilisation even more remote as the bank had to provide large amounts of refinancing that 
further reduced its reserves. The exchange rate continued to fluctuate below its silver parity, not 
to mention its gold parity. 
The collapse of the silver market, after 1873, precipitated the evolution of the Austro-
Hungarian currency away from its former standard.12 The decline in the price of silver eventually 
caught up with the floating value of the florin on international exchange markets. A fall in the 
price of silver below the mint price of the florin (adjusted for arbitrage expenses) signalled 
profitable arbitrage opportunities. One could buy silver on the open market and have it coined in 
Vienna and buy Viennese bills-of-exchange of a higher value. In 1879, the Austrian mint was 
flooded with coinage orders and the government decided to suspend the right to coin for 
individuals.13 This policy, which was echoed in several other countries, prevented silver from 
becoming a ballast on the florin, and as a result, the price of silver bars went below that of the 
florin. The monarchy thus embarked on what was essentially a freely floating exchange rate 
system, since the gold parity was only nominal, and merely used for official accounting, or for 
gold denominated foreign debts. Returns from the Vienna bourse show the 8 florins gold coin 
quoted essentially as a foreign coin. 
Thus, while the suspension of silver coinage for private account was a further step away from 
the silver standard, it was hardly a final one. Both Austria and Hungary retained the right to coin 
silver for their own use. With part of their debt in either silver or paper florins (which were 
identical after 1879 as silver florins, being legal tender, traded at 1:1 against paper florins), the 
two governments could benefit from buying silver on the market, and using the proceeds to 
discharge themselves from their obligations with coins that were cheaper to produce.14 The gain 
was proportional to the amount coined and to the existing spread between the price of silver and 
the exchange rate of the florin. Thus, the depreciation of silver, by rendering silver coinage 
attractive, created an incentive for governments to increase the silver money supply. As a matter 
of fact, silver coinage persisted in the Monarchy until 1889.15 This mechanism however, had its 
own checks. The government’s incentive to coin silver could not lead to massive issues for the 
resulting inflation would have depreciated the gulden to the point where the advantage of coining 
silver would have gone to zero.16 In turn, this complex link with silver generated speculative 
behaviour on the foreign exchange markets with financiers trying to anticipate the evolution of 
money supply on the basis of the variations of the price of silver. 
This situation was aggravated by yet another mechanism.17 The value of silver acted as a 
‘floor’ for the price of the freely floating florin: the ÖUB held a large stock of silver and 
presumably the bank would use its reserves, should the florin threaten to depreciate below the 
price of silver.18 In the language of target-zone theory, silver was thus a ‘reflecting barrier’ for the 
florin, even if a moving one. Any change in the relationship between gold and silver prices had to 
be factored into expectations of future changes in the exchange rate of the florin in terms of gold 
currencies.19 Thus, while the automatic link between the florin and silver had been severed in 
1879, the latter still continued to have a remote influence on the former through a number of 
‘indirect’ channels: this is how contemporaries explained the correlation between the 
international value of the florin and the price of silver bars, which in some cases could be 
striking.20 
This situation created a conflict between the Bank and the political authorities. While the 
accumulation of silver in the vaults of the central bank counteracted the ÖUB’s attempts at 
accumulating gold in preparation for an eventual adoption of the gold standard,21 market 
expectations on the effects of the movements of silver prices on the florin exchange rate 
counteracted its objective to stabilise the currency. The ÖUB obviously resented this situation, as 
it found that the actions of the governments threatened to jeopardise its efforts. The sudden rise in 
the price of silver in the Summer of 1890, caused by the evolution of the silver legislation in the 
United States, created a fierce bout of gulden-silver speculation. Tracking the price of silver, 
which reacted favourably to the Sherman Act, the florin then began re-appreciating. This turned 
out to provide the proximate solution to the silver question, as the two governments were now 
faced with the evils of exchange fluctuation without the rewards of seigniorage, and at the same 
time affecting Austro-Hungarian exports adversely.22 
Figure 1. The Florin/Mark Exchange Rate. Florins / 100 Marks, 1870-1914 
Yet, the influence of the episode in determining the subsequent course of action should not be 
over-emphasised. Discussions over the need to stabilise the currency had been going on for many 
years, and after 1887, both Austria and Hungary began to make efforts to limit their deficits. 
Moreover, after 1889, both began to adopt measures providing for the acquisition of gold, in 
preparation of an eventual adoption of the gold standard. In January 1890, the Vienna 
correspondent of Crédit Lyonnais’ economist intelligence unit – the service d’études financières - 
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reported on a conversation he had had with the head of the director of the Vienna office of the 
ÖUB. The director had indicated that plans were being drafted for a “large consolidation loan” 
that would be split in two separate issues, with Austria obtaining 70%, and Hungary 30%, of the 
total, and used to mop up the outstanding government paper notes:23 Indeed, the question of the 
stabilisation of the currency involved finding a way to recall the outstanding circulation of about 
400 million florins in state paper, a legacy of the 1866 military campaign.24 
2) Valuta Regulierung: currency stabilisation in Austria-Hungary, 1890-1899 
Austria-Hungary decided to finally adopt the gold standard in the early 1890s in order to put an 
end to the further revaluation of the florin that began in 1888 (Figure 1). The price of 100 marks 
went from 62.5 fl. 1888:1 to 54.5 florin in 1990:9. This 13 % decline in the value of the mark 
made life difficult for Austro-Hungarian exporters. In addition, the standard, fixed at 58.78 florin 
was seen as easing the access to West European capital markets.25 As already mentioned, various 
schemes were discussed in 1890. In October rumours circulated about the parity at which the 
currency would be stabilised, in turn, causing even further temporary gyrations of the exchange 
rate.26 From the point of view of the global capital market, there could hardly have been a worse 
timing. The Argentinean collapse in 1890 had depressed the international bond market and 
created extreme tensions in London and other leading European money markets, thus making 
foreign loans, as well as the acquisition of gold, fairly problematic.27 Some argued that German 
banks, having their funds locked in Latin America, and unwilling to provide for the necessary 
write-offs, liquidated instead the firmer portion of their portfolios, which typically included 
Austro-Hungarian securities. In the foreign press many observers were critical of the Austro-
Hungarian reform that would result in further difficulties.28 The rumours about the exchange rate 
continued and volatility persisted. 
In early 1892, however, the reform process accelerated. In February of that year,29 
L’Economiste français reported that the monarchy had initiated formal contacts with the 
Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The meetings had been 
“satisfying” with British officials providing their Austro-Hungarian counterparts with “unofficial 
advice on how to avail themselves of the facilities of the London market without perturbing it 
unduly. The representatives of the Dual Monarchy on the other hand explicitly assured the British 
that nothing would be done precipitously, and without taking into account the interest of all 
parties”.30 On March 8th  two commissions of experts gathered separately in Vienna and 
Budapest.31 While the consensus was far from complete, the commissions on balance favoured 
the adoption of the gold standard and suggested that the parity for the new currency, the crown, 
should be computed from the average exchange rate of the florin in the past.32 In order to stabilise 
the currency by providing an anchor to expectations, the new parity was circulated in “unofficial 
communiqués” in the following weeks.33 Of course, the expected protests were heard from 
holders of the monarchy’s paper and silver debts, who hoped to get a higher gold value for their 
claims.34 Nonetheless, in August 1892, the new monetary law was ratified by the Austrian 
Parliament, and in early 1893 by the Hungarian one.35 This law formalised the new basis of the 
Austro-Hungarian currency, and revised the existing conventions between the bank and the two 
parts of the monarchy. The gold content of new gold crown was fixed.36 The ÖUB was to stand 
ready to purchase gold bars at par, minus a rebate that covered coinage expenses. Silver coinage 
for government account was tightly limited for the future, and was mostly to consist of recoinage 
of older issues. The use of silver for the payment of large amounts was prohibited. Finally, and 
most importantly, it was decided that the two governments would provide gold to the central 
bank, at the same time as they would withdraw from circulation the state notes which at the close 
of 1892 amounted to some 312 million florins.37 However, as long as a sufficient gold reserve 
had not been accumulated by the Bank, it appeared that the completion of the reform, whose 
“final act” would be the beginning of gold payments by the ÖUB, was to be postponed. 
This, in turn, raised the question of how to find ways to provide for the purchase of gold and 
its exchange for government notes. The issue of new loans was not recommended.38 Instead, it 
was decided to use the improvement of the price of Austro-Hungarian securities (which had been 
brought about by the reduction in the burden of their interest rate service through reduced 
indebtedness and increased taxation) to exercise the conversion option which was included in 
these securities (as in many government securities of the time). This would have enabled them to 
raise more funds (and thus acquire the means necessary to implement the reform), while keeping 
the burden of interest service constant. It was thus decided that the 5% paper and silver “special” 
(i.e. own) debts of Austria and Hungary would be exchanged, as fiscal authorities had the option, 
against new 4% bonds.39 The operation - whose negotiations were finalised in early January 
189340 - took place between January 24 and February 7,41 and the proceeds accruing from the 
operation was reinvested to purchase gold.42 While Hungary had by then essentially reached the 
level of gold which it needed to repurchase its share of the outstanding notes43, Austria still 
needed to undertake further action. In February 1894, Plener, the Austrian finance minister, 
presented to the Austrian parliament additional bills for that purpose. In the meantime, however, 
the exchange rate still experienced large swings, with the agio going up to 7%. Observers 
explained this in reference to the violent movements of international capital that surrounded the 
crisis in the United States,44 and some worried that the reform was still “ imperfect and 
incomplete”45, as long as some form of gold convertibility would not be introduced. 
Until 1892 the bank did not have much holdings of foreign bills-of-exchange, but the gyrations 
of the crown in 1893-94 led the government to ask the bank to be much more involved in this 
niche of the market at the expense of the Viennese commercial banks. In 1892 the bills held by 
the bank amounted to a minuscule 47,000 crowns, however, by the early 20th century, the bank 
held foreign bills of exchange in the amount of between 200 and 300 million crowns. This was in 
addition to its gold reserves in the neighbourhood of 1,000 million crowns. Thus, market power 
to influence exchange rate expanded enormously.46 The bulk of the repurchase of government 
paper against gold eventually took place in 1895 and 1896 when 110 and then 70 millions of state 
notes were withdrawn from circulation (Figure 2). All the reduction in this component of the 
Austro-Hungarian stock of high powered money gave rise to a corresponding increase in reserves, 
with the central bank issuing one note for each unit of government paper which was paid back to 
it in gold.47 This obviously implied a dramatic improvement in the “effective cover ratio” of the 
Austro-Hungarian bank of issue. Bank had to pay a tax of 5% on its notes issued above 400 
million crowns.48 
While the ÖUB had generally fulfilled its statutory limits inasmuch as its ‘own’ notes were 
concerned, the existence of a huge amount of government paper which was a perfect substitute 
for bank notes in practice reduced the effective cover. By contrast, the reimbursement of 
government paper and its exchange for gold drastically improved the effective cover, which 
increased from 29% in 1890, to 43% in 1895 in 1896, and 61% in 1899.49 The stabilisation of the 
florin eventually took place in 1896 (Figure 1), as the ÖUB began to implement a policy of 
foreign exchange intervention whenever the value of the still inconvertible florin approached its 
notional ‘gold’ export point. The timing of the decision is quite understandable, if we recall that 
the statutory cover ratio for the ÖUB was 40%:50 indeed, it is precisely in the months that 
followed the consolidation of OÜB’s ‘effective cover ratio’ above the 40% threshold that the 
bank of issue’s adoption of the shadow gold standard can be said to have begun. 
Figure 2: Break down of M1 in Austria-Hungary, 1890-1899 
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The policy was not legally binding, rather it resulted from implicit expectations from 
government circles. As a matter of fact, debates surrounding the renewal of the statutes of the 
OÜB, due to expire in 1897, as well as disagreements between Hungary and Austria regarding the 
degree of control over the common bank prevented the formal implementation of gold 
convertibility. In 1897, external observers were worrying about the actual success of monetary 
stabilisation, arguing that the difficulties surrounding the renewal of the privilege of the ÖUB did 
cast a long shadow on the completion of monetary stabilisation. They feared that if full 
convertibility of the notes of the Bank was implemented without a clear agreement on the Bank’s 
statutes, then one may face a run on the bank’s gold reserve, and – if the bank refused to honour 
its implicit obligation to redeem its notes in gold - a depreciation of the crown would ensue.51 
After drawn out discussions and temporary extensions of the bank’s legal mandate, its charter 
was finally renewed by the law of September 21, 1899: though at that date, no agreement was yet 
reached on the gold convertibility policy. 
3) The shadow gold standard: 1896-1914 
The issue of convertibility remained on the agenda until the very demise of the Monarchy.52 
Yet, between 1896and 1914, the OÜB successfully implemented a shadow (de facto) gold 
standard, whereby it let the exchange rate fluctuate within informal narrow margins that more or 
less coincided with the gold points.53 From 1901 onwards it essentially accepted its notes in 
exchange for gold coins, albeit at its own discretion.54 Though it could change its policy at any 
time, the fact that the public was not particularly eager to use this facility meant that the policy 
remained stable. The stability of the currency was widely recognised by contemporaries. The 
public’s preference for even small denomination paper money over gold coins, is a good 
indication of the bank’s credibility.55 At the same time, the negotiations over the formal 
introduction of gold convertibility was bogged down in a nexus of complex political agendas, 
thus explaining the duration and confusion of the debate over the policy of gold convertibility. 
The crux of the dilemma was the disagreement between Austria and Hungary over the future 
of the bank. Since a fraction of the Hungarian establishment pushed for monetary secession, the 
problem of the possible liquidation of the common bank could not be overlooked. The reserves of 
the bank had been accumulated through transfers made by both governments, and each part 
remained legal owner of its share. Had the bank been split up, both governments would have 
expected to have their investments returned. However, it was unclear what would happen if the 
liquidation took place at a time when the reserves were below the level of the two governments’ 
claims. This was a compelling reason for not committing the bank to use its gold reserves 
excessively, and as a result de jure convertibility was postponed indefinitely. Hence, the 
“provisional” shadow gold standard became the permanent modus operandi. The system emerged 
from the OÜB’s decision in 1896 to peg the crown to gold within a narrow margin, and then from 
its policy, adopted in 1901, to accept convertibility in principle, without a binding commitment. 
The question of whether convertibility was desirable or not was intensely debated. According 
to the German economist, Knapp, for instance, the absence of legal prescriptions committing the 
OÜB to gold convertibility enabled the bank to maintain lower interest rates by insulating it from 
foreign disturbances. In contrast, von Mises believed that engraving the actual practice into law 
would “considerably improve” the dual monarchy’s international credit, and thus interest rates 
“for only the de jure gold payments would clearly convince everyone abroad that Austria-
Hungary enjoys nowadays a perfectly regulated currency”.56 An economically more rigorous 
argument was articulated by Walther Federn, editor of the Österreichische Volkswirth, and much 
later by Paul Einzig, in his well-known book on forward exchange. Their opinion was that the de 
facto stabilization of the crown after 1892, and its sustained ability to shadow an effective gold 
standard after 1896, actually conferred on the Austro-Hungarian currency considerable credibility. 
In effect, Federn suggested that enacting convertibility into law would be counterproductive, 
insofar as it brought with it the danger that the credibility of the currency would be shattered if the 
obligation could not be met in times of crisis. “It is not enough to enact convertibility, one must 
be also be able to maintain it.” In addition, continued Federn, the bank had more flexibility 
maintaining the exchange rate near pari with the current system, without having to resort to 
raising domestic interest rates. This, in turn, was a distinct advantage to the economy.57 
Einzig argued also, that this credibility represented a genuine asset for the central bank. 
Anticipating an argument eventually proposed by Keynes to use the fluctuations of exchange rates 
within the gold points as a way to prevent costly interest rate increases, the OÜB was able, 
according to both Federn and Einzig, to derive all the advantages associated with a credible 
currency. As Einzig put it, “by 1907 the de facto stability of the krone had been maintained for 
about fifteen years […] The public both in Austria-Hungary and abroad trusted this de facto 
stability to some degree”.58 According to him, the public was thus taking bets, each time the 
crown depreciated, that it would eventually reappreciate. This analysis suggests that at the turn of 
the century, the crown really belonged to the select club of core currencies, along with the pound 
sterling, the franc, the reichsmark, and the dollar, rather than to the more mundane group of 
peripheral currencies that probably included the rubel or the Southern currencies in Europe and in 
Latin America. However, if we consider the gyrations prior to 1890, and the slow escape from the 
“silver anchor”, the transition to credibility is sufficiently puzzling to deserve further scrutiny. It 
is to this issue that we turn in the next section. 
II. Speculation and credibility: some indicators 
As argued in the introduction, one important theme of the literature on the pre-1914 
international monetary system is that speculation was stabilising for core countries but 
destabilising for the peripheral ones. One view on the matter, developed, for instance, by 
Marcello de Cecco and inspired by the experience of countries such as Italy, is that speculation 
was for them a rampant plague that could at times jeopardise their precarious financial balance.59 
But the Habsburg experience has suggested different conclusions: focusing on the period of 
flexibility, Yeager forcefully argued that the “usual horror stories about disruptive speculation 
[…] proved inapplicable” to the Habsburg case.60 While remaining cautious about explaining 
what he saw as essentially “mild” fluctuations of the florin, he clearly pointed to speculation and 
arbitrage as factors that contributed to the “breadth, depth and resiliency” of financial markets, 
something that, according to him, was inherently stabilising. Einzig makes an essentially similar 
claim, but instead for the period of fixity.61 In the end both periods of flexibility and quasi-fixity, 
have inspired the general view that the Habsburg precedent provides a benign perspective of short 
term capital movements and foreign exchange speculation. In the main, if a currency is not 
undermined by fundamental weaknesses, then no undue fluctuations of the exchange rate should 
take place without triggering profitable and moreover stabilising arbitrage. If we accept this 
conclusion, we should then either recast our view of the problems faced by “peripheral” 
countries, or alternatively think of the florin and the crown not as peripheral currencies, but as 
part of the core club. 
a) Futures of the past 
In order to discuss this matter, a useful route is to collect information on foreign exchange 
speculation – as opposed to the level of the exchange rate, which was extensively discussed in the 
preceding section. Specifically, one very important source from that respect, is the returns from 
forward transactions which – unlike what was the case among the leading “core” currencies – 
developed in central European financial markets to purchase cover against the movements of  
weaker currencies. Futures in foreign exchange facilitated transactions in both goods and 
securities across borders if both countries were not on the same commodity standard. Thus, while 
there was no reason for futures among the German reichsmark, the French franc, or the pound 
sterling to develop (because all were on the gold standard in the late nineteenth century and 
expected to remain so), among the rubel, mark, and the gulden such a need did exist, insofar as 
Germany was both Russia’s and Austria-Hungary’s most important trading partner, and both were 
effectively on a flexible exchange rate until the 1890s. In order to cover merchants’ risks, as well 
as risks associated with securities denominated in foreign currencies, the largest markets in 
currency futures evolved in Central Europe during the last third of the nineteenth century with 
traders specialising in the business.62 A large forward market in rubels came into being first in 
Breslau and Königsberg, – and then in Berlin,63 and futures in rubels were also traded in 
Vienna.64 Berlin lost its dominant position in rubel futures at the end of 1894 after the infamous 
bear squeeze65 when the Russian Finance minister announced that the government intended to 
defend a fixed exchange rate, and the Russian Central Bank began publishing these rates  in mid-
April 1895.66 Gulden-mark futures came into being out of the same considerations, probably well 
before the data began to be published in 1876.67 
In Vienna, as in other European markets, there was also a forward market in general securities. 
These forward transactions were to be settled – liquidated – mostly at the end of the month, 
named after the French word «liquidation». As emphasized by Haupt, international arbitrage in 
securities was a routine operation in late-nineteenth-century Europe that involved little or no 
apparent risks and brought substantial profits.68 It rested on lending securities where the «report» 
rate was high and borrowing money where the rate was low. Doing so, however, involved an 
element of risk due to the possibility of exchange fluctuations. This was especially a problem for 
arbitrage between western European financial centres and Central and Eastern ones such as 
Vienna and St. Peterburg, which had close financial connections with Western Europe (large 
chunks of Russian and Austro-Hungarian securities were held in Western Europe), but which 
experienced violent exchange rate movements. Obviously, the only way to be covered against 
these fluctuations was to have a forward exchange market that would clear at the same dates as 
the markets for forward securities, and thus enable one to perform a «true» (i.e. risk free) 
arbitrage. It is, thus, hardly surprising to find that, along with the «ultimo» quotes for general 
securities there were also in Vienna «ultimo» quotes for German marks and Russian rubles, in 
addition to the «spot» (or «per cassa») rates. Interestingly, this provides a rationale for the 
development of the forward markets that points to the combined influence of floating exchange 
rates and international financial arbitrage. 
Data were collected on spot and forward rates for the first of every month (first day after the 
«liquidation»), whenever possible.69 If data were unavailable (typically, if that day was a bank 
holiday, we used the next available quote. The ultimo rates represent market expectation one 
month ahead. Figure 3 plots both the florin exchange rate and the forward florin exchange rate. 
While a large number of exercises could be conducted using these series, this paper, which 
provides the first insights and results of an ongoing research effort, seeks to make two main 
points. First, we discuss the hypothesis according to which forward speculation was destabilising. 
Second, we use simple tests to study the evolution of the credibility of the florin over time. 
Figure 3. The volatility of the florin and the crown. 
 
b) Volatility of expectations and stability of the exchange rate 
Regarding the first issue, our starting point is the intuition that the forward florin should 
contain, in an efficient market, information on the expected rate of exchange. In fact, with risk 
neutral and rational speculators, the forward rate quoted at the beginning of the month for 30 days 
ahead, should just be a measure of the expected exchange rate for that horizon. It follows that, if 
speculation was inherently stabilising, the volatility of the forward rate should be less than the 
volatility of the spot rate.70 As a matter of fact, scholars who have investigated the issue of 
“excessive volatility” on financial market, have always sought to demonstrate that expectations 
were more volatile than the outcomes they were supposed to anticipate.71  
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Volatility measure: actual exchange rate  changes
Volatility measure: expected exchange rate changes
In order to explore this question we have computed a measure of the volatility of exchange rate 
changes both expected and actual. Formally, we computed a weighted average of a) expected 
changes in the exchange rate and b) actual changes in the exchange rate. 72 These two measures of 
volatility73 (Figure 3) reveal several episodes of extreme exchange rate volatility until 1896, 
against a relatively high level of general volatility. The Summer of 1870, the period 1876-1878, 
and, perhaps not surprisingly given the discussion above, the year 1890 stand out as exceptional. 
The final such episode was 1893-1894, after the half-hearted attempt at stabilising the florin 
failed. In addition, the considerable reduction in exchange rate volatility that followed the 
stabilisation of the florin in the late 1890s become obvious. 
A second striking feature is that the volatility of expected changes in the exchange rate was 
almost always smaller and more often dramatically smaller than the volatility of actual changes. 
Thus the forward market does not seem to have been in itself a cause of instability – a conclusion 
which echoes that of Yeager.74 In fact, it is interesting to remark that it is precisely in 1876, when 
the exchange rate fluctuated violently, that we begin finding a systematic series for the forward 
exchange rate. This, in itself, suggests that the formal quotation of a forward rate was a 
consequence of the uncertainty created by the gyrations of the Austrian currency: thus the 
development of the forward exchange market in Vienna might be seen as a response to, rather 
than as a cause of, exchange rate instability. 
Finally, Figure 3 enables us to distinguished among three phases: 1) The era of the “true float” 
(1876 -1888) during which the volatility of the spot rate was quite high, but that of the forward 
rate was very small; 2) The era the gradual stabilisation of the florin  (1889-1896) when the 
volatility of the exchange rate tended to decline (albeit with occasional outburst of instability), 
that of expected exchange rate changes increased cyclically. This can be interpreted as the 
outcome of speculative behaviour with agents on the Vienna market taking bets on the future 
evolution of the florin/crown based on frequent announcements and rumours. Repeated 
announcements and rumours that were in turn proven wrong may have led investors to take 
unwarranted speculative positions, and thus create additional source of expectational instability 
that were not entirely mirrored in true outcomes. 3) The period after 1897 was the era of the 
shadow gold standard. During that epoch, the volatility of actual exchange rate changes declined 
substantially, while the volatility of expected exchange rate changes returned to its pre-1889 
level. Moreover, the evolution of both volatilities is much more correlated after 1897 than before. 
This suggests that the stabilisation of the florin accompanied an improvement in the 
informational environment, resulting in a lower volatility ratio. The smaller variations of the 
crown after it was stabilised were probably also better predicted. 
 
Figure 4. The Crown – Florin Exchange Rage 
c) A credibility test 
In order to assess the credibility of the Habsburg currency throughout the period of its 
stabilisation (1892-1914), we perform a test which is a variant of Svensson’s “100% confidence 
band”75 This test rests on the following intuition: a credible currency should be expected by 
market participants to remain within its pre-assigned band. From 1896 onwards, the OÜB began 
shadowing an informal band of ± 0.4% around parity, set in March 1893. We investigate whether 
(and when) market participants recognised this principle and priced the forward florin 
accordingly. In other words, this test rests on comparing the forward florin with the [ ± 0.4%] 
zone which the OÜB is supposed to have operated from 1896 onwards.76 
This is depicted in Figure 4, representing the forward rate during the period 1892:1 to 1914:2, 
the crown parity, and the notional fluctuation band. As can be seen, the early 1893 attempt at 
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stabilising the crown was short lived. Very soon, market participants expected the crown to 
depreciate well below parity. By 1894 however, the move was brought to a halt and the trend was 
reversed. The favourable expectations surrounding the crown accelerated in 1895, and by the 
Spring of 1896 expectations entered the target zone. Moreover, they basically stayed there until 
the First World War, apart some brief discrepancies, the most notable one being the one around 
1900. However, as is evident from Figure 1, which describes the spot exchange rate, this move of 
expectations out of the “band” was associated with a move of the exchange rate itself out of the 
band: apparently, the OÜB decided to let the florin fluctuate a bit more. In other words, the 
observed expected depreciation reflects the transitory weakness of the crown, and possibly a 
widening of the band,77 rather than a fundamental credibility problem, whereby a currency lying 
inside its band is expected by the market to depreciate. After 1900, the expectations were 
invariably within the band, indicating that the interventions of the OÜB not only stabilised the 
exchange rate, but also convinced the market that the crown would remain within a tiny 
fluctuation band of less than ± 0.4%. Clearly, according to the simple but powerful measure used 
here, the florin had become a credible currency in the eyes of the market. 
Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed the record of the Habsburg currency during the final half century of 
its existence. While typically portrayed as a member of the group of peripheral countries, it does 
not seem to have been the focus of especially vicious speculation. The forward exchange market, 
where florins (crowns) were traded against marks seems to have been at worst a mere instrument 
for cover, at best a source of stability, but in any case, not a source of exchange rate fragility. 
The remarkable achievement of the Dual Monarchy, despite well known internal political 
problems which some might have seen as natural sources of exchange rate instability is quite 
fascinating and puzzling at once. It is, in fact, amazing, how quickly the credibility of the bank 
was established after it began to make a serious effort at maintaining the parity of the currency in 
1896. One would have thought, that the market would have been more sceptical at accepting its 
policy at face value, particularly initially. Yet, this was not the case: the bank's credibility was 
almost immediate, and as a matter of fact, even the Bosnia-Herzegovina or Balkan crises do not 
seem to have had a major impact on the stability of the currency. Further research would be useful 
to understand just how this credibility was established so quickly. 
On the surface, one might be tempted to conclude that the conventional ranking of Austria-
Hungary in the group of peripheral countries is inappropriate on the basis of its financial 
development and sophistication. Austria-Hungary might well have been considered as a sound 
country, so that the gold-point band was immediately credible to the market, because the Austro-
Hungarian Bank itself was already credible. Here, it might be useful to distinguish between 
credibility of the institution and credibility of a given policy. But basically, the main finding is the 
considerable credibility of a country that has not been portrayed in the literature as one of the 
main players in the late-19th early-20th century financial world. Given that a division of the Bank 
between the two constituent parts, Austria and Hungary, was bound to have monetary 
consequences, the above consideration suggests that such a split was not truly expected by the 
market. Two additional inferences come immediately to mind: one is that the scholarly literature 
might well have underestimated the true economic performance of the monarchy, though this is 
rather unlikely.78 A more plausible explanation is that the monarchy’s financial sector was far 
better developed than might be expected on the basis of its macroeconomic performance.79 As a 
consequence, our framework for analysis of pre-1914 international monetary relations – and 
especially the supposed dichotomy between core and peripheral countries – should be seen as 
somewhat too narrow and restrictive. We conclude on the basis of the evidence presented in this 
paper that the amorphous zone between core and periphery, might well include another category 
of countries whose importance has so far not been properly acknowledged in the literature. This 
very thesis has, in fact, been suggested in a recent book on the Rothschilds by Niall Ferguson. He 
proposes a typology of late-19th century countries that uses the countries’ net external position to 
define its place in the hierarchy of development: in between the “net creditors (Britain and 
France)”, and those who had to “borrow large amounts from abroad (Russia and Italy)”, Ferguson 
finds room for the “self financing but not capital importing” countries whose archetype was, he 
argues Austria-Hungary. According to him, these “financial factors had a bearing on diplomacy”. 
This paper suggests that they might have had a bearing on the exchange rate record of the 
monarchy as well.80 Future research should determine more fully just how that record came 
about.  
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